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ABSTRACT
Models are central to scientific thinking and essential to many kinds of practical problem-
solving. Imbued with different meanings in different contexts, the word model implies structure and
relationships among variables and also conveys tentativeness and incompleteness. Building models
for science differs from building models for problem solving because the goals expand from strict
scientific fidelity to include organizational and societal utility and so lead to more customized,
complicated and artful models. Building models is a creative process in which understanding a
problem and its context expands and deepens iteratively, as the model builder tries to reduce the gap
between the model representation and the object being described. Ethical dilemmas easily arise in
the interaction among the model builder, the model builder's client and those further persons or
organizations with whom the model builder's client may interact. The situation is exacerbated by
different cultures, cognitive styles and organizational responsibilities. Among possible ameliorative
measures are attention to the management of expectations, advance specification of model evaluation
criteria, incessant education and communication, and open access to the model itself.
Introduction
Models are central to scientific thinking and essential to applying scientific knowledge to
practical problems. In this paper we explore four aspects of model-building: (1) the meaning of the
word - examination of its usage reveals multiple perspectives. (2) Models for science vs. models
for problem-solving - different goals lead to distinctively different approaches for model construction.
(3) The process of building models - where do they come from? how are they built? (4) Social
responsibility - a look at potential sources of ethical dilemmas.
What do we mean by models?
The word, model, turns up frequently both in conversation and in writing and, like any
popular word, means different things to different people. Going back a century or two, physical
scientists believed they were discovering the laws of nature. We find Newton's laws of motion,
Kepler's laws for describing the movement of the planets and Snell's law for the refraction of light,
to name a few. But so many of these laws began to be repealed, or at least amended, (Newton's
law, for example, by Einstein's relativity theory) that a more conservative and tentative word came
into use - models. Later, when the social scientists started to quantify their world, they did not find
relationships among their variables that were as precise and complete as in the physical world. So
they embraced the word quite naturally. Model captures an important texture of tentativeness and
incompleteness that we often want in describing our knowledge. Biologists, too, have adopted the
term but in a rather different way. By a model they mean a biological system that can be used as
an analog for another biological system. Thus, a genetically altered mouse might be a model of a
human in terms of responding to a particular type of cancer.
I find that my own use of the word depends on the person to whom I am talking. With
fellow model-builders, I mean something fairly precise; when talking to others - perhaps managers
or dinner guests or newspaper reporters - either I don't use the word at all or I use it rather
diffusely. My informal definition among model-builders is that a model is a mathematical description
of how something works. Good examples are: F=ma, distance = rate x time, and the economic
lot size model. When I use the term among such people, it connotes structure, mechanism,
functional relationships among variables, and inputs determining outputs.
But there are nuances and quality differences. Here are a few:
Statistical models. Is a linear regression a model? Obviously, yes. Yet, linear
regressions represent such a broad and flexible class of models that they contain within themselves
less a priori structure and less information than, say, most physics or OR/MS models like F=ma or
the economic lot size model. Each of the latter makes a strong structural statement about a specific
phenomenon. A goal of the statistician is to provide estimation procedures and probabilistic
statements that apply as generally as possible. Therefore, statistical models tend not to say much
about phenomena until particularized to a given situation by application. Often the convenience of
data analysis afforded by standard statistical models leads the user away from building deep structure
for problems and to less powerful models than might be desirable.
1
Decision analysis. Is decision analysis a model? Well, wrong question. Analysis
does not equal model. Decision analysis provides a logical structure for the decision making process,
i.e., it specifies a series of problem-solving steps that a decision maker can take. A decision analysis
application may also contain one or more explicit or implicit models about how the world works:
events are defined and assigned probabilities, the utility of the decision maker is related to possible
outcomes, and outcomes are related to alternatives.
Procedures and algorithms. Is the simplex algorithm a model? Is the exponential
smoothing of a time series a model? No, I say, although models are lurking in those activities.
Procedures and algorithms certainly have inputs and outputs just as most models do. Yet, I think
our language is richer and more useful if we make a distinction between model and procedure. Thus
in the linear program
max z
subject to
z=cx
Ax =b
x>O
the last three lines constitute the model. Our normative aspirations are expressed in the max and the
simplex method is a way of finding a solution, but these are separate from the model itself.
Similarly, I would tend to view exponential smoothing as a computational procedure. Distinct from
the calculation is an underlying model of a process, represented by certain recursive equations and
probabilistic assumptions.
Social science theories. In social science the term model appears all the time when
there is no mathematics anywhere in sight. Model here means theory: a system of related concepts
to describe an idea or phenomenon. Quite frequently, I use model in this way too, particularly with
people who are not mathematical model-builders. The word helps convey the tentative and
incomplete nature of the theory.
These then are some niceties in the way the word is employed. Many people in OR/MS
would likely share these views, but other disciplines may have somewhat different usages.
Model building for science
Building models for science differs from building models for OR/MS or engineering. The
differences lie in the criteria employed, both for choosing what to model in the first place and for
judging the model when it is finished. Furthermore the process of building the model changes.
Science is concerned with describing the universe with fidelity and parsimony. These
fundamental criteria tend to determine which work survives to be recapitulated in the text books of
the next generation, although scientists care about other qualities as well. They respond to elegance,
beauty, and surprise. Problem selection is also affected by personal motivations that go unrecorded
in the scientific journals: salary, promotion, tenure, and Nobel prizes.
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Scientists have developed a variety of tests for assessing fidelity: they think up and enumerate
threats to validity, try to falsify a result, develop alternative hypotheses and devise critical
experiments or observations that will discriminate among them. They make predictions and compare
these to observed outcomes. Such devices help convince scientists and their peers of the robustness
and generality of their discovered knowledge.
Model-building for problem-solving
Most of us in OR/MS, policy-analysis and
the like are trying to help organizations make
improvements in the world, or at least in their
corner of it. Having a goal tends to change and
clarify the model-building process. Interestingly, I
can think of many more how-to-do-it lists for the
problem-solving side of model-building than for
purely scientific work.
The first difference is that in problem-
solving we presuppose a client or customer. This
might be a manager, an organization, or possibly
society as a whole. The model-builder is a
consultant and model-building is imbedded in a
larger consulting process. The principal goal
becomes to improve the client's welfare (although
we should keep in mind potential conflicts of
interest relating to the model-builder's welfare).
New criteria for model quality come into play.
Fidelity and parsimony are welcome but not at the
expense of relevance. It may be better to be
vaguely right than precisely wrong.
People have devised a variety of how-to-do-
it problem-solving paradigms that relate to model-
building. We shall briefly describe three: (1)
systems analysis, (2) the phases of OR, as
presented in an early OR text (Churchman, Ackoff
and Arnoff, 1957), and (3), one of my favorites,
Urban's (1974) "Building Models for Decision
Makers." The last is interesting because it
explicitly recognizes the role of model-building
within the consulting process itself.
Figure 
SYSTEMS ANALYSIS
1. Define Problem
Scope
Objectives
Measures of effectiveness
Constraints
Control variables
2. Develop Alternatives
Identify subproblems
Determine alternate ways
ofsolving subproblems
Synthesize alternative
overall solutions
3. -Evaluate: Alternatives:
Formulate model of'
system
Calibratemodel from data
Evaluate alternatives
Select best
4.. Satisfied? .
Yes.. : -Quit:.
Figure 1 shows a step by step recipe for systems
the problem, developing alternatives, and evaluating
analysis. It consists of the stages: defining
the alternatives. The process anticipates
multiple iterations through some or all of these steps, since system analysts do not conceive a model
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in one fell swoop but cycle around, developing ideas and fitting pieces together.
Paradigms like this are useful.
They provide check lists. People who Figure 2
have been working on problems develop
heuristics, constructs, and chunks of useful PHASES OF OR
knowledge for solving them. A
programmed list helps jogs such materials Churchman, Ackoff and Arnoff (1957)
out of memory and get them used in an
organized way. Key words direct one's
thinking along certain pathways that need to 1. Formulating te problem
be examined.
2. Constructing a mathematical model
Although none of us treat such to represent the system under
prescriptions rigidly, they contain study.
considerable wisdom. It is fair to say that
Figure 1 presents, in terse form, some 3. Deriving a solution from the model.
really important ideas about the structure of
this kind of problem-solving: the notion of 4. Testing the model:and the solution
defining the problem - that it must have derived from it.
finite and defined scope and that you need
not only broad objectives but also narrow 5. Establishing controls. over the
measures of effectiveness with which to solution.
compare alternatives. The world is
constrained and you should explicitly 6. Putting the solution to Work:
examine those constraints (perhaps with a implementation.
view to modifying some of them). And
obviously you have to identify the variables
and other actions you can control. There is
little that is more fundamental than the idea
of developing alternatives or of breaking a
problem into smaller problems and trying to synthesize solutions from manageable pieces. The
notion of evaluation is critical, as is the role of models and data in doing this. Finally, we have the
necessity of choice.
Churchman, Ackoff and Arnoff's (1957) phases of OR in Figure 2 is shorter and less rich,
but introduces several ideas not in the systems analysis description. These include testing the model
and an explicit concern for implementation, as well as the concept of "controlling the solution." By
this phrase the authors mean that the environment of the problem may change and render the
proposed solution invalid. Thus the solution needs to be controlled in the sense of quality control
for an industrial process.
Urban (1974) has gone a step further, as shown in Figure 3, drawing on organizational
development ideas, particularly those of Kolb and Frohman (1970). He points out that we do not
approach a practical problem with a blank sheet of paper, but in fact arrive with priors about what
the issues are and how we might model them. Furthermore, our success in actually effecting change
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Figure 3
BUILDING MODELS FOR DECISION MAKERS
Urban (1974)
-Formulation of. Priors
Entry into the Organization
-- :1 - -. - - I
~> I eLkrLOflem rlu.Llng 
Specification of
Model Development -Criteria
Tracking and X
Evolution
Model Building
Calibration -and Testing
.. , -- - . . .in 
depends critically on how we enter the organization. Do we come at the request of the president?
Or are we trying to sell ourselves in at the bottom and work up through several organizational layers
to the level at which our work would be used? Do we come through a gatekeeper, for example,
through marketing research to reach marketing management? These are important questions and,
if we are really going to help the organization, they are critical strategic issues for us as model
builders and prospective change agents.
Once we are in the organization, there comes the question of finding and defining the
problem. Ordinarily, problem finding works by uncovering a discrepancy between where the
organization is on some key dimension and where it would like to be. Following this stage, Urban
introduces another step not mentioned in most standard prescriptions: the specification of model
development criteria. This means establishing with the client rules by which the model results will
be judged. It is a key step that is often omitted or insufficiently treated in consulting practice. The
result is frequently misunderstanding at a later date. The client remembers the sales pitch and the
consultant notes the vagueness of the actual contract. Needed is discussion early in the engagement
to produce a mutually understood document that clarifies expectations. The handling of this step has
much to do with the client's satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the project.
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Following this is the model-building stage itself. Urban's prescriptions includes calibration,
testing and, finally, model use. Then in situations where the models will have ongoing application,
there is tracking of predicted vs. actual outcomes and evolutionary improvement of the model. Such
a feedback and incremental improvement process is common in decision support applications (Little,
1975).
Problem solving prescriptions like these mean the most to people who have tried, at least to
some extent, to perform the process. To those who have not, the paradigms seem relatively opaque
and meaningless. I find that undergraduate students are likely to see such recipes as so much hot
air, but after a summer job trying to solve practical problems, they relate to the ideas much more.
A really experienced person is also likely to find the prescriptions superficial because the main
principles have long since been internalized and second order subtleties have become salient.
A final point is familiar to all model-builders but totally foreign to almost all clients: A
model should be imperfect. It should fit the task at hand, i.e., it should include important
phenomena and should leave out the unimportant ones. This exhortation begs the question of which
is which, but anybody who has done analyses in live contexts knows well the pressure from the client
and the critics to include more and more detail in the model, and the importance of resisting many
of these pressures. One of the difficulties in making models useful in practice is that a problem
always contains aspects that can be blown out of proportion by word pictures and one-of-a-kind
anecdotes. It is often necessary to resist model expansion in order to prevent the project from
becoming too large and unwieldy and to avoid expending excessive resources on activities that will
not really affect the results. There are often tough calls; to make good model design decisions you
need side analyses and arguments and also organizational processes that bring the clients' inputs and
judgment into play.
Two other important problem-solving paradigms that make heavy use of models are decision
analysis and soft systems methodology. Decision analysis is a whole field dealing with problem
structuring and decision making. See, for example, Keeney and Raiffa (1976), Howard (1988) and,
for a recent update on theory and practice, the special issue of Interfaces (Nov-Dec 1992) on decision
and risk analysis. Soft systems methodology (Checkland, 1981) consciously integrates problem
solving into organizational processes. Without describing these methodologies in detail we note that
they too set contexts for model-building in which relevance, understandability and sufficiency for the
task at hand are more important criteria for judging a model than the classic scientific goals of
generality and accuracy.
Where do models come from?
Some people seem to sit down and produce an insightful and relevant model with apparent
ease. How do they do it? Much has been written about problem-solving. Smith (1988, 1989)
reviews and discusses a selection of this work.
If I were to give a personal, one word answer as to where my models come from, I would
say: dissatisfaction. When working on something I often feel a discontent at the state of my
understanding - a conviction that something is not right and that I understand part of what is going
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on but not enough. And I need to think about the problem more, work out further details and
express them, verbally and mathematically.
This description fits quite well with certain standard ideas about problem-solving - that we
encounter a difference between our goal and our present state and try to reduce it. The view of
differences as a driving force has a long history. Newell, Shaw, and Simon (1960) use it in their
General Problem Solver. It is basic to Pounds (1965) theory of problem finding. And, of course,
it has roots in feedback control, which goes back at least to Watt and his governor for a steam
engine.
These ideas can be embedded in a process. When I am building a model, I often find it
useful to go through a series of fairly well defined steps. The first is to write down what I want the
output to look like. If the model is supposed to produce computer output, I may sketch a list of
output variables or even a screen display in the form that I would like the results to take.
As a second step, I look at the outputs and write down the inputs I think will be required:
what data, what relationships, what values for parameters, etc. Just writing down the inputs, of
course, implies that I have some sort of rough notions about key phenomena and cause and effect.
Where do these come from? From past experience or general knowledge about the subject, often
gathered by interviewing people who know about the problem and by reading background materials.
Then, having written down outputs and inputs, I have created a difference between them that
needs to be closed. So the final step is to work on the model - what assumptions are required to take
inputs into outputs, what functional relationships are needed. At this point we are on the way.
The process goes through iterations. Ideas change about what the outputs should be. Inputs
are never right the first time, and the steps, assumptions, and relationships in between are subject
to much learning and development. But the basic procedure works well in many situations. The
reason is that the outputs conjure up in one's mind ideas about what inputs are required and inputs
and outputs together push one to hypothesize relations between them, and so the development of the
model moves forward rather naturally.
Now one thing that the psychological literature makes clear is the importance of prior
structures. Thus the concept of a linear model is imbedded in many of our heads so deeply that we
are unaware of it. An archaeologist recently asked me to comment on a paper about diets of early
American Indians. Without recognizing it as such, the authors were building a linear model of diet,
but they lacked any background with linear equation systems. The result was an awkward and
inefficient treatment of something that could be described and understood quickly by someone
familiar with linear models.
Another prior structure for model-building is decision analysis. Still another would be
econometric models. The thinking and priors about solving a problem are likely to be quite different
for a person trained in econometrics from another in decision analysis. Other priors might come
from knowledge of mathematical programming, stochastic processes or system dynamics. When you
have some of these structures in your head, you see them everywhere and bring along the intuition
that goes with them. So prior bodies of knowledge are places that models come from.
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At the same time, however, prior models form a prison of preconceived ideas. This is often
a subject for concern - one hears the complaint that somebody "has linear program - will travel".
How can we break out of preconceived ideas? The issue has spurred much discussion. For
example, in his book reviewing research on judgment and decision making, Bazerman (1986) talks
about heuristic-breaking heuristics and catalogs a few, brainstorming, being a prototypical example.
The idea is to liberate and enlarge your thinking space.
How I had my great idea. Some models turn out to be deeper, richer and more relevant than
others and to break new ground. They are more creative. Creativity is another topic with much
anecdotal data and considerable research. The mathematician Poincar6 in a famous essay on
mathematical creation (Newman, 1956) tells of climbing the steps of a bus and having a flash of
revelation in which he saw exactly how to solve a problem he had been working on unsuccessfully
for weeks. One might conjecture that aspiring mathematicians would start taking public transit, but
actually, the 'aha' or 'eureka' phenomenon is well-known and well-documented. What happens is
that people make an intense effort to solve a problem and the effort, even if unsuccessful, forms an
important preparatory stage. This is followed by a relaxation and release of mental activity below
the conscious level. Subsequently, key ideas often surface. (This was Poincar6's own explanation
of what happened.) The formal description in Bazerman's book identifies the steps as: preparation,
incubation, illumination, and verification. Research has shown that at the verification stage many
seemingly creative people fail to be truly creative, because the euphoria of the 'aha' is not followed
by the hard reality of testing. I think many of us have experienced the euphoria stage only to tear
our ideas to shreds a few hours later.
To summarize: Models favor the prepared mind. In building models we bring to bear
heuristics and structures we have used before. Various check-lists and paradigms can help organize
our thoughts. But prior knowledge also tends to blind us to fruitful new directions in problem-
solving. Breakthroughs are facilitated by conscious efforts to bring new ideas to the problem, often
in a sequence of intensive effort, followed by backing away, and, after a delay, the release of a fresh
flow of ideas.
Social responsibility
Social responsibility and ethics are the topics of this workshop and although they will be dealt
with at length by others, I have found myself thinking about them while preparing these general
remarks. It is not clear that ethics in model-building is fundamentally different from ethics anywhere
else but the circumstances and manifestations can be different and dilemmas arise in new contexts.
We identify two stages and three actors in the process of problem-solving with models.
These combine in multiple ways to create fertile opportunities for misunderstanding and conflict of
interest. The first stage is the interaction and knowledge transfer that takes place between the model-
builder and the immediate client. Thus an OR/MS professional works for a manager, or a consulting
firm does a study for EPA.
But there is usually a second stage - between the client and a third party, the client's client.
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Let's call the client's client the supraclient. Thus an internal OR/MS consultant may build a model
for a marketing manager about whether or not to introduce a new product. Then the marketing
manager will very likely turn around and take the results of the model to the president of the
company, the supraclient, and ask for money to launch the product. In the public systems arena,
a consulting firm may do a study for EPA. But then EPA may take the study to Congress. The
second stage is an integral part of the value-creation process and introduces new dilemmas.
There are a variety of pitfalls for the model-builder in these situations. Here are some:
(1) The client already knows the answer. What the client really wants is
justification for an answer in hand, not a new answer. This is bad news for the
modeler, especially when the client's desire was not conspicuous in the beginning.
There is great potential here for ethical dilemmas. For example, the model builder,
being employed by the client, feels pressured to produce the prescribed answer even
if he or she finds it faulty.
(2) The client presses the model-builder for early answers. Time pressure is no
surprise; everybody wants results yesterday. But sometimes preliminary results are
delivered, and sometimes they are too preliminary. The client may prematurely take
a position on the issue with his/her supraclient. Subsequently the model-builder
learns more and wants to change the results. This can be very difficult and create
great stress.
(3) The client does not really understand the basis for the model-builder's results.
Consequently the client is uncomfortable about using them and is hesitant about
taking them to his/her supraclient. This is a very common situation.
(4) The black and white problem. Both clients and supraclients would really like
to have results with certainty - black and white answers. Let me paraphrase a
characterization of managers and model-builders from an earlier paper (Little, 1970):
Managers know only two probabilities, zero and one, whereas model-
builders know all probabilities, except zero and one.
Furthermore, managers act before they think, if they ever think,
whereas model-builders think before they act, if they ever act.
Another popular articulation of such managerial behavior is: "Ready, Fire, Aim."
One dilemma for model-builders that arises out of these contrasting cognitive styles goes as
follows: The model builder says: "Maybe I should just figure out what is right and then present that
solution as black and white as I can." In other words, "Perhaps I should I do my analysis and come
to my own decision about what is the best action and then simply emphasize that which will support
the action and, without deliberately concealing anything, downplay evidence that doesn't favor the
proposed action." The obvious difficulty with this approach is that the client's knowledge and values
may not be accurately reflected in the final choice of action, so that the client's decision-making
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responsibilities have been usurped by the analyst.
(5) Having the client provide judgmental input. This is something I have
advocated (Little, 1970) and is, of course, everyday practice in decision analysis.
But, if the client's judgments largely determine the results, people can ask: "Is this
a sell-out that uses scientific trappings to push a preconceived solution?" Here we
again need to recognize the two stages of the process. It seems reasonable for a
client to put in judgmental inputs when the client is also the decision maker and a
principal gainer or loser from the outcome - after all, it is his/her problem. Where
things become sticky is when the content of the analysis is to be carried forward by
the client to a supraclient. Suppose a model-builder does an analysis of whether a
product should be introduced and takes it to a marketing manager, but the latter does
not make the decision alone. Now suppose the marketing manager puts extensive
personal judgements into the model and then takes the results to the president to ask
for resources to go forward. Does this create an ethical dilemma for the original
model-builder?
(6) All models are incomplete. The client probably does not realize this to the
extent that the model-builder does. The client may not understand too well what is
missing and what is not and, in fact, really wants black and white answers in the first
place. So what are the model-builder's responsibilities?
Now it is my hunch that, if I were a playwright, I could take any of these dilemmas and
make it into a good TV drama, showing some poor model-builder caught between great forces,
abandoned by friends, and ready to jump off the Golden Gate bridge with a UNIX workstation
chained to a leg.
Ideas to improve social outcomes. There are no panaceas, but here are a few suggestions
that might alleviate some of the pressures. First of all, the front line is anticipation and prevention.
Part of this is the management of expectations with clear prior specifications and criteria for
evaluation of the model. A lot more is education, communication, and close involvement of the
client - all vital yet expensive activities. The model builder should take responsibility for providing
the client with valid, understood, problem-solving information. As model builders we should
understand what we have done and be confident about what we can or cannot say. This requires a
whole lot of testing and evaluation as we go along and the communication of the essence of our
results to the client.
On this score I have a two sets of questions for managers to ask any consultant, internal or
external, who is building a model or doing an analysis for their organization. The first is:
(1) What is the answer? What are the conclusions of the study?
Given these, a mangager should ask: "Do I, as the client, believe these conclusions? Why or why
not?". In other words (and many managers do this instinctively), clients should compare the results
presented to them with their own mental models and intuition and should discuss the differences with
the model-builders. The second set of questions is:
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(2) Why did the answer come out as it did? What were the key
assumptions and data that determine the results? And what was the
essential reasoning between input assumptions and output results?
Any good model-builder should be able to answer these questions clearly in lay language and,
indeed, should have asked them of him/herself. Now, one of the tricky aspects of model-building
for problem-solving this is that the greatest benefits lie in coming up with unexpected answers. Thus
in favorable circumstances we shall have produced something different from the client's mental
model. But at the same time such answers require the most testing. But that's OK, it's the business
we are in.
Related to the issue of conflicting goals of client and supraclient is the problem of multiple
clients with quite different world views - for example, a marketing manager and a production
manager for a decision involving a new product. Kusnic and Owen (1992) describe an interesting
approach to this problem: The analysts do two projects, one from each point of view, and have the
participants understand both sets of results and negotiate the final decisions.
Another suggestion, which picks up certain themes in an earlier paper (Little, 1970), is that
we should design models as much as possible to be transparent, that is, easy for the client to
understand, with inputs and outputs expressed in everyday terms with readily interpretable units.
Sensitivity analysis should be easy to do and the models should be robust in the sense that it should
be hard to get nonsensical answers from them. We should also seek open and transparent validation,
i.e., testing done in ways that are easy for the client to understand and ask questions about.
A further possibility is to introduce some form of peer review and open debate. This
sometimes takes place automatically on public issues but in corporate settings is largely missing.
Adversarial debate also has a downside, because, although devil's advocates are important, much
good analysis is artful and has carefully left things out that should be left out and put things in that
should be in. It is easy to conjure up phantoms and claim that effects not included are so important
that their absence invalidates the results. Skepticism and critique are healthy, but we should not
complicate and self-criticize ourselves into impotence when we have a lot to contribute. As stated
earlier, our underlying responsibility is to provide the client with valid, understood, problem-solving
information.
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